Stibal v. Fano Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 40427 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-29-2013
Stibal v. Fano Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40427
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Stibal v. Fano Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40427" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4481.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4481
ADVANTAGE LEGAL SERVICES 
Stephen A. Meikle, Attorney, P.A. 
Idaho State Bar No. 2976 
Idaho Professional Building 
482 Constitution Way - Suite 203 
Post Office Box 51137 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1137 
Telephone (208) 524-3333 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
VIANNA STIBAL, dba, THET AHEALING, ) 
INSTITUTE OF KNOWLEDGE, INC., and ) 






APRIL F ANO and ) 






Docket No. 40427-2012 
APPEAL FROM 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
For Appellant: 
Alan Johnston 
151 North Ridge, Ste 210 
Post Office Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
For Respondents: 
Stephen A. Meikle 
482 Constitution Way, Ste 203 
Post Office Box 51137 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1137 
I. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
II. TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES .................................................... p. 4 
III. STATEMENT OF CASE ................................................................................ p. 7 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE ................................................................... p. 7 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ................................................... p. 7 
111. STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................... p. 10 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .............................................................. p. 19 
A. WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT BREACHED HER 
AGREEMENT WITH RESPONDENT? ............................................. p. 20 
1. WAS APPELLANT SUBSTANTIALLY 
INVOLVED IN DISSEMINATING 
DISPARAGING, DEFAMATORY 
OR NEGATIVE STATEMENTS ABOUT 
RESPONDENT AND DISCLOSING ANY 
MATTERS, DOCUMENTS AND MEDICAL 
RECORDS REGARDING RESPONDENT 
WHICH WERE DISTRIBUTED AFTER 
APPELLANT AGREED NOT TO DO SO? .............................. p. 20 
2. DID APPELLANT PERSONALLY PAY FOR 
THE PRINTING OF "SHADY HEALING"? .............................. p. 20 
3. WAS RIGHT WAY PUBLISHING FINANCED, 
MANAGED, AND CONTROLLED BY APPELLANT 
BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER JULY 30, 201O? ................. p. 20 
4. DID APPELLANT PROFIT FROM SALES OF THE 
"SHADY HEALING" AFTER JULY 30, 2010? .......................... p. 20 
B. WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT 
RESPONDENT SUFFERED ACTUAL DAMAGES 
OF $6,250.00 ....................................................................................... p. 20 
2 
C. WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
THAT (l)APELLANT'S CONDUCT vVAS INTENTIONAL, 
EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS AND (2) PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES WERE APPROPRIATE? ...................................... p. 20 
D. WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT? ....... , ................................. p. 20 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. .................................................................. p. 20 
VI. ARGUMENTS ................................................................................................. p. 22 
1. Standard(s) of Review .......................................................................... p. 22 
A. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SlJPPORT THE TRIAL COlJRT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT BREACHED HER 
AGREEMENT WITH RESPONDENT ......................................... p. 23 
1. APPELLANT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY INVOLVED 
IN DISSEMINATING DISPARAGING, 
DEFAMATORY OR NEGATIVE STATEMENTS 
ABOUT RESPONDENT AND DISCLOSING 
ANY MATTERS, DOCUMENTS MEDICAL 
RECORDS REGARDING RESPONDENT 
WHICH WERE DISTRIBUTED AFTER 
APPELLANT AGREED NOT TO DO SO .................... p. 24 
2. APPELLANT PERSONALLY PAID FOR 
THE PRINTING OFTHE "SHADY HEALING" .... ............. p. 25 
3. RWP LLC WAS FINANCED, MANAGED, AND 
CONTROLLED BY APPELLANT BEFORE, 
DURING AND AFTER JULY 30, 2010 ......................... p. 26 
4. APPELLANT DID PROFIT FROM SALES OF 
"SHADY HEALING" AFTER JULY 30,2010 .................. p. 30 
B. THERE WERE FINDINGS OF SUBSTANTIAL 
AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSION THAT RESPONDENT SUFFERED 
ACTUAL DAMAGES OF $6,250.00 ...................................... p. 30 
3 
C. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT 
(1) RESPONDENTS CONDUCT WAS INTENTIONAL, 
EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS AND (2) PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES WERE APPROPRIATE ................................................... p. 33 
D. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IN FAVOR OF 
RESPONDENT .......... '" ................................................ p. 38 
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. p. 38 
II. 





Appel v. Lepage 135 Idaho 133, 15 P. 2d 1141 (2000). ..................................... ................ p. 32 
Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881,522, P. 2d 1102 (1974) ................... p. 35 
Boise Dodge Inc. v. Clark 92 Idaho 902,453 P. 2d 557 (1967) ..... ..................................... p. 35 
Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 P. 3d 723 (2003) .............. ..................................... p. 21, 37 
Brown's Tie & Lumber v. Chicago Title, 115 Idaho 56, 61, 764 P. 2d 423, 428 (1988) ... ... p. 32 
Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463,220 P. 2d 682 (1950) ........................................ .. p. 34 
Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 665 P. 2d 661,668-69 (1983) ................................ .. p. 35 
Chick v. Tomlinson, 96 Idaho 483, 531 P.2d 573 (1975) .............. .................................... .p. 29 
Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 688, 496 P. 2d 687 ........................... ..................................... p. 35 
4 
Cuddv}.1ountain Concrete, Inc. v. Citadel Construction Inc. 121 Idaho 220, 225, 824 
P.2d at 156 (1992). ... ... ... ... ..... . ... ,. ... ... . .............................. .................................... .p. 32 
Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 740,536 P .2d 511 729, 735 (1975) .......... .p. 31 
Erwin Contr. Co. v. Van Ordern, 125 Idaho 695 699-700, 8740 .2d506 ............................ .p. 32 
509-511 (2002). 
Glenn v. Gotzinger, 106 Idaho 109, 675 P.2d 824 (1984) .............. ..................................... p. 22 
Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest 100 Idaho 851, 606 P. 2d 955 ....................... ..... p. 36 
Hayhurst v. Boyd., 50 Idaho 752,300 P.895 (1931) ................................ ...................... p.27 
Hellar v. Cenarrusa 106 Idaho 571, 682 P. 2d 524 (1984) ............ ..................................... p . . 21, 37 
Horn v. Boise Citv Canal Co., 7 Idaho 640, 65 P. 145 (1901) ....... ..................................... p. 35 
Jensen v. Bledsoe, 100 Idaho 84, 593 P.2d 988 (1979) .................. ..................................... p. 
Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 772 P.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1988) .................................... p. 22 
Jollev v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879 (1966) ...................... ........ .p. 27 
Klam v. Koppel. 63 Idaho 171, 118 P. 2d 729 (1941) ................... ..................................... p. 36 
Linscott v. Rainier Life Ins. Co 100 Idaho 854, 606 P. 2d 958 (1980) ................................. p. 35 
Macleodv. Deed 126 Idaho 669,671,889 P. 2d 103,105 (Ct. App, 1995 .......................... p. 21 
MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hosp, 108 Idaho 588, 701 P.2d 208 (1985) ....................... p. 22 
Metz v. Hawkins, 64 Idaho 386, 133 P.2d 721 (1943) ..... .................................................... p. 27 
Middendorfv. Fugua Industries, Inc., 623 F.2d 13 (1980) .................................................. p. 30 
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc. 99 Idaho 911, 591 P. 2d 1078 (1978) ........ .......... p .21 
Mountain Restaurant Corp. v. Parkcenter Mall Assocs., 122 Idaho .................... ......... p. 32 
261,265,833 P .2d 119,123 (1992) 
Morrison v. Quality Produce, Inc. 92 Idaho 448, 444 P. 2d 409 (1968) ..... ...................... .p. 36 
Nelson v. World Wide Lease, Inc., 110 Idaho 369,378,716 P.2d 513,522 (1986) ............ p. 32 
5 
Pointerv. Johnson, 107 Idaho 1014,695 P.2d 399 (1985) ............. ..................................... p.22 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Johnson, 93 Idaho 850, 476 P. 2d 786 ........ .p.29 
(1970) 
Rankin v. Rankin, 107 Idaho 621, 691 P.2d 1236 (1984) ............... ..................................... p.22 
Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817,761 P.2d 1169 (1988) .................. ............. p.33 
Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74,644 P.2d 1333 (1982) ................................................. p.21 
Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 884,42 P. 3d 672,677 ......... p.21, 38 
Sprinkler Irrigation Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co. 139 Idaho 667 P. 3d 667 ........................... p. 21 
(2004) 
Sun Valley Shamrock v. Travelt}rs L~l:iasin:z, I 18 Idaho I I 6, 794 p.2d 1389 ............. ........... p. 33 
(1990) 
Sun Valley Shopping v. Idaho Power 119 Idaho 87, 90, 203 P. 2d 993, 996 ....................... p. 36 
(1991). 
SUlttS v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho. NA., 110 Idaho 15,22,713, P.2d 1374, 1381.. ... .......... p. 33 
(1985) 
SuretyLi{e Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc. 95 Idaho 599,574 P. 2d ..................... .p. 27, 29 
554 (1973) 
Swenson v. Hernmann 119 Idaho 497, 498-99, 777 P. 2d 269, 270-71 ............................... p. 38 
(1989) 
Thompson v. Dalton, 95 Idaho 785, 788,520 P. 2d 240,243 (1974) ................................... p. 36 
Tom Nakamura, Inc. v. G&G Produce Co, Inc., 93 Idaho 182, 457 P. 2d 422 ..................... p. 27 
(1969) 
United States v. Jon-T Chemical, Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (1985) .......... ................................. p. 29 




Idaho Code §12-121 .................................................................... .................................... .p. 20,21, 
36 
D. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Idaho Appellant Rules (fA.R.) 41 .................................................. .................................... .p. 21 
Idaho Appellant Rules (fA.R.) 11.1 ............................................... ..................................... p. 21 
Idaho Rules o/Civil Procedure (fR.CP.) 52(a) ........................... .................................... .p. 22 
Idaho Rules o/Civil Procedure (fR.CP.) 54(e)(1) ....................... ..................................... p. 35 
Idaho Rules o/Civil Procedure (l.R.CP.) 59(a)(5) ....................... .................................... .p. 33 
III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(i) Nature of the case. 
Appellant entered into an agreement with respondent to settle a defamation suit brought 
against appellant by respondent. Appellant agreed to keep respondent's medical records and 
documents confidential and not to disparage or defame respondent in consideration for monetary 
compensation paid by respondent. After appellant received the agreed upon compensation, she 
promptly published a despicable book accusing respondent of cultism, deceit, false teaching, 
fraud, lies, misrepresentation, prostitution, stealing, and using cocaine and heroin. 
(ii) Course of proceeding. 
On March 3,2011, Vianna Stibal and ThetaHealing Institute ofK.nowledge Inc. 
(Respondent) brought suit for breach of contract against April Fano and Right Way Publishing, 
LLC (Appellant) in the Seventh District Court in Bonneville County for damages in excess of 
seventy-two thousand five hundred dollars ($72, 500). (R. Vol I, pp. 1-5). Respondent's claim 
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for breach of contract was based upon her release agreement with appellant settling all the claims 
of appellant and respondent in a prior defamation case filed by respondent against appellant in 
Bonneville County Case No. CV-2009-1852 (R. Vol. I, pp. 2-3). 
AppeIIant filed an answer on April 5, 2011, alleging, inter-alia, that: (1) any statements 
made by appellant were expressions of her opinion, (2) appellant was not the author of any 
statements in the book "Shady Healing," (3) April Fano was not responsible for the actions of 
Right Way Publishing. (R. Vol I, pp. 9-10). 
Respondent filed a motion to amend her complaint on January 30,2012 to add claims for 
breach of covenant of good faith, fraud in the in inducement contract, fi-aud upon the court, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages (R. Vol 1. pp. 12-20). 
Respondent filed a motion for ruling on her amended complaint April 23, 2012, (R. Vol 
II pp. 1-6; R. Vol 1. pp. 12-20,22-25; ROA report! case docket p.3, 4/23/2012). Appellant filed 
an objection to respondent's motion to amend on May 3,2013. 
The trial court ruled on respondent's motion(s) to amend on May 21, 2013, stating that: 
Although the defendant's agree that the action of April Fano upon which 
plaintiffs based this motion occurred before July 30,2010, the book at issue 
was set to be published after July 30, 2010. As such, this court finds that, 
"Plaintiffs have met their proof to amend the complaint to include punitive 
damage. Where this case is not being tried to a jury, the court will 
determine the full application of the amendment at trial." 
(R. Vol L p. 31, par 3). 
Appellant filed an amended complaint on May 24,2012, withdrawing claims of 
claim of unjust enrichment, defamation, and libel. CR. Vol. L, pp 34-38) 
Appellant and respondent stipulated that (1) appellant's claim for unjust enrichment, 
defamation, and libel were withdrawn, and (2) the remaining issues to be tried before the 
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court were breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive 
damages. (R. Vol. I. p. 39) 
A court trial was held on June 11 th and It\ 2012 before the Honorable Jon. J. 
Shindurling. He rendered his opinion on September 2,2012, ruling that: (1) Respondent 
breached her contract with appcllant; (2) Respondent proved actual damages of six thousand 
two hundred fifty dollars ($6250); (3) Appellant's claim of unclean hands did not apply, (4) 
Respondent's claim for severe emotional distress was not sufficient, (5) Appellant's conduct 
was intentional, extreme and outrageous; (6) Appellant's conduct was an "extreme deviation 
from reasonable standards of conduct and was performed with a disregard for its likely 
consequences," and (7) Punitive damages in the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) 
were appropriate in this case. (R Vol. 1., pp 41-54; p. 54, par. 1, 7-8) 
Judgment was entered in favor of respondent on September 20,2012, awarding six 
thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($6250) for actual damage and fifty thousand dollars 
($50,000) for punitive damages plus interest. (R. Vol. 1. p. 56). 
Respondent filed a memorandum and affidavit for an award of fees of twenty seven 
thousand six hundred dollars ($27,600) and costs of one thousand six hundred one doIIars 
and seventy cents ($1601.70) on October 13,2012 based on the release agreement provision 
for attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party under paragraph 11 of the agreement. (R. 
VoL II, pp. 15-29; Exhibit 1; Appendix 1). 
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on the 1 i h day of October, 2012. (R. Vol, 1. p. 58). 
An amended notice of appeal was filed October 25, 2012. (R. Vol 1. p. 67) 
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The clerk's certificate of appeal and exhibits were filed October 25,2012. The 
clerk's celiificate of the record, exhibits, and transcripts were logged with the Supreme Court 
and entered February 1, 2013. (R. Vol I. pp.71-77). 
Appellant filed an affidavit, motion, and memorandum for fees and costs with an 
objection to respondent's fees and costs on October 12,2012. (R. Vol II., pp. 31-47). 
Judge Shindurling issued an opinion and order on the parties' motion(s) for attorney 
fees on November 29,2012, granting respondent's motion for fees of twenty-seven thousand 
six hundred seventy dollars ($27, 670.00) and costs of five hundred sixteen dollars and 
seventeen cents ($516.70) and denying appellant's motion for fees and costs. (R. Vol 1., p. 
62-66). 
Final judgment was entered February 12,2013, awarding respondent six thousand 
two hundred fifty dollars ($6250) for breach of contract, fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for 
punitive damages, twenty seven thousand six hundred seventy dollars ($27,670) for fees and 
five hundred sixteen dollars and seventy cents ($516.70) in costs, and total judgment of 
eighty-four thousand four hundred and thirty-six dollars ($84,436.70) plus interest at the 
legal rate of 5.25% (R. Vol. II pp. 48-49). 
This comi entered an order March 13,2013, declaring that appellant's objection and 
motion to augment record to the record on March 5, 2013 was moot as an order to augment 
the record was entered March 5, 2013; and the document requested in the augmentation was 
previously filed with the court. 
Further, the appellant was ordered to file its brief on or before thirty-five (35) day of 
the order dated March 13,2013 [or April 14, 2013]. 
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Appellant did not file its brief until August 13, 2013 or one hundred fifty days (150) 
days after the court's above order. 
(iii) Statement of facts. 
Appellant and respondent entered into an agreement to settle a pending lawsuit between the 
parties, arising from respondent's claims of defamation libel and slander and appellant's counter-claim. 
Their agreement provides in pertinent pali: 
8. April [Appellant] and Vianna [Respondent] "agree to keep confidential the 
terms of this Agreement, as well as all matters, documents and medical 
records pertaining to the Lawsuit ... 
9. Appellant and Respondent agree not to make any disparaging, 
defaming, or otherwise negative comment regarding each other to any 
th ird party ... " 
(R. Vol pp. 43, 44; PIn's Exhibit 1, See Appendix 1) 
Respondent testified that Appellant did not abide by her promises made in their 
agreement as appellant and Lindsey Stock published a "horrible" book, Shady Healing, 
which disclosed respondent's medical records and accused respondent of deceit, lies, 
false teaching, stealing, misrepresentation, fraud, disrespect for the law, hard drug use, 
cocaine, heroin and acid, as well as cultism and prostitution. (Tr. p.39, L9-11, 15-16, 18; 
pAO,L.1-7,16-22). 
Respondent testified that Shady Healing is "devastating ... [April] says unbelievable 
lies ... they call me a cult. I'm like Mansons ... the hatred that flows out ofthis ... [is] pure 
hatred .. .it's painful." Respondent exclaimed that her blood pressure rose and her heart broke. 
(Tr. pA2, L.3-6, pA3, L.11-12, 17,19; pA4 L.1-5). Respondent's husband, Guy Stibal, 
testified that when Shady Healing became known to Vianna, it caused Vianna a lot of 
emotional trauma, and Vianna got really upset. It caused her sleeplessness and a lot of 
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hem1ache. He explained that: "Vianna is a very sensitive-by nature a very sensitive 
person .. .if someone disparages her without recourse, or really without foundation of truth, it 
affects her to the very core of her being." (Tr. P. 113, L. 4-5, 9, 13-14, 16, 19-20; p.114, L. 
14-17). 
Respondent offered into evidence the book titled Shady Healing as Exhibit 3 and 
testified that the author of Shady Healing is Lindsey Stock and the publisher is actually 
appellant. Respondent submitted the Articles of Organization for Right Way Publishing, 
LLC, signed by appellant and Lindsey Stock and listing them both as co-managers as Exhibit 
4. (Tr. p.47, L5-8, 16,20-24; See Appendix 2). 
Respondent testified that anyone can still obtain Shady Healing, which states all of 
these mean things, and breached appellant's promise not to make any disparaging, 
defamatory, or negative comments about her. (Tr. pA2, L10-18, 21). 
Respondent exclaimed that Shady Healing calls respondent's healing modality, 
ThetaHealing, a cult and likens respondent to the "People's Temple, Manson Family, Branch 
Davidians, etc." (Tr. p.48; L6, 21-22, 24-25; See page 2 and 469 of Exhibit 3). 
Respondent revealed appellant's motivations to harm respondent. Respondent had 
rejected (1) appellant's insistence that all respondent's teachers sign up under appellant's 
multi-level vitamin marketing program, and (2) appellant's demand to pay her back for a bad 
investment that appellant had made with respondent's son, Josh Opfar, who was Lindsey 
Stock's former husband. (TR. p. 25, L 2-13; p. 26, L 10-24; p. 41, L. 4-5). 
Respondent raised Judge Blower's findings in Lindsey Stock's ease with Josh Opfar, 
quoting his decision that: "Lindsey has also authored a book, Shady Healing, primarily attacking 
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Thetahealing, but also accusing Josh of lying, stealing, and fraud ... Lindsey's conduct has been 
inequitable, unfair, and dishonest." (TR. pp. 249-250). 
Respondent testified that Shady Healing refers to respondent's spinal surgery at page 
374, and prints excerpts from her medical records at page 375 provided in the case she settled 
with appellant. (Tr. p.49, L19, 21). 
Respondent pointed out that Shady Healing contains excerpts from her deposition where 
appellant's attomey Alan Johnston was asking questions of respondent in their settled case. (See 
Exhibit 3, p. 379). Respondent testifies of the further disturbing excerpts from her deposition by 
appellant's attomey, Alan Johnston appeared in Shady Healing on page 387 which begins with 
his allegation that respondent was "faking cancer and making fraudulent claims." 
More excerpts from her deposition taken on February 4th, 2010 appear on pages 391, 
392, and 467 of Shady Healing. (Tr. p.51, L.I0-18, 21-22; p.52, L4-10, 21-22; p.53, L 3-8,20-
25). 
Shady Healing's states the author's "intention is to show that the claims brought f01ih 
regarding ThetaHealing are bogus, the root of the Theta tree is lies, deceit, fraud and the proofs 
are exaggerated, claims of inconsistencies that have spread fi-om teacher, respondent, to students, 
practitioners, and clients." (Tr. p.56, L.14-20, 23-24). 
Shady Healing provides statements from a person named as Tyra who is actually the 
appellant. Page 183 states: "Tyra had only contacted five people who wamed them that the 
[ThetaHealing] doctorates were not valid, were in fact illegally given." (Tr. p.57, L. 19,22-25; 
p.58, Ll, 4-12,17-18). 
An e-mail from Tyra, aka appellant, is re-printed in Shady Healing on page 208 and 
alleges that respondent is fraudulent and illegal, lies to her students, and accuses respondent 
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of misrepresentation. Appellant fmiher states respondent is not to be trusted on page 213. 
(Tr. p.S8, L20, 22-25; p.59, L. 4-13; p.60, L. 9-20, p.61, L. 1,3-8). 
Shady Healing quotes Tyra's, aka appellant's, email saying: "Oh, one last thing 
from my attorney. How exactly did I breach my contract and license with you? Just 
because you don't like the truth and had caught you being fraudulent and lying ... " (Tr. 
p. 61, L.3-8; See Exhibit 3, p. 212). 
Shady Healing further states that (1) respondent did not pay her taxes, (2) her school 
is not legal, (3) respondent is selling fake doctorates and (4) respondent is scamming people. 
(Tr. p.62, L. 9,13,15-18,21; p. 63, L. 4-10,14-15). 
Shady Healing accuses respondent of cocaine use, saying she is a heavy drug user 
using heroin and massive amounts of cocaine and stating that respondent confessed to 
sleeping with anyone in order to pay for her cocaine. (See Exhibit 3, p.358). (Tr. p.65, 
L. 10,13, 16-25; p. 67, L.1). 
Shady Healing reprints an e-mail which says "ThetaHealing is dangerous," and 
alleges that respondent's ThetaHealing friends end up dead at page 282. (Tr. p. 64, L 4-
5,11-12,16-19; See Exhibit 3, p. 282). 
Appellant also authenticated exhibit 1 as the settlement agreement she entered into 
with respondent on July 30,2010. Appellant agreed that she read and signed the document. 
She admitted that she and respondent agreed not to make any disparaging, defaming or 
otherwise negative comments regarding each other from the date of the agreement on page 3, 
paragraph 9 of exhibit 1. (Tr. p.149, L.25; p. 150; p.150, L.3-23; p.15!, L.5-23). 
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Appellant testified that in the agreement she entered into with respondent on July 30, 
2010, she and respondent agreed to keep confidential the terms of the agreement, all matters, 
documents and medical records pertaining to the lawsuit. (Tr. p.152, L.2-12). 
Appellant agreed that she received the respondent's check on July 30,2010, in the 
sum of twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500), admitted as exhibit 2, and that the 
check was the consideration that she had bargained for under the agreement, exhibit 1. (Tr. 
p.152, L.19-25). 
Appellant admitted further that in her deposition taken August 5, 2011, that she had 
paid Sunrise Press on July 21,2010 for the printing of Shady Healing. She admitted that the 
estimate and invoice presented to the court was probably the invoice from July 21,2010 and 
that there were 500 copies of Shady Healing printed. (Tr. p.154, L.6-16, 25; See Exhibit E & 
F; Appendix 3 & 4). She picked up the books which were printed by Sunrise Press and 
delivered them to Lindsey Stock for distribution on August 2, 2010. (TR. p. 244 L. 14-25; p. 
245, L. 1-4). 
Appellant admitted that the paid invoice bears the date of July 21st, 2010, and she 
paid for the printing of Shady Healing. (See Exhibit F, Appendix 4). The following day, 
appellant fom1ed RWP, LLC, in the State of Utah. The articles of organization of RWP, 
exhibit 4, reflects appellant's signature which she signed on July 22, 2010. Appellant agreed 
that she is a co-manager ofRWP. Appellant also admitted that she is the registered agent for 
RWP and that RWP's place ofbusiness is her home located at Saratoga Springs, Utah. She 
confirmed that nine days before she entered into the agreement with respondent to settle the 
lawsuit between the two of them is when, she paid for the printing of Shady Healing. (Tr. 
p.156, L.9-16, 22-25; p.156, L.1-21; p.157, L.11-14). 
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Appellant acknowledged RWP's articles of organization were not accepted until July 
22,2010, the day after she paid for the printing of the Shady Healing on July 21,2010. She 
signed the LLC paperwork on July 22, 2010 and the date on the articles of organization for 
RWP is July 22nd, 2010. Appellant testified that when she entered into the agreement with 
respondent on July 30th, 2010, she knew about the printing of Shady Healing and R\VP, 
which she formed to distribute Shady Healing, but, she nevertheless, agreed, not to make any 
statements that were disparaging, defamatory, or otherwise negative towards respondent as 
well as agreed not to disclose, or to keep confidential, all matters, documents, and medical 
records relating to the lawsuit. (Tr. p.157, L.16-20; p.158, L.2-14, 18-25). 
Appellant said that she had read Shady Healing and that page 374 of Shady Healing 
has infom1ation including respondent's final surgical pathology of her surgery date of August 
22, 1995. Appellant admitted that it is a medical record of respondent and that the medical 
records were part ofthe lawsuit going on between her and respondent before July 30th, 2010 
and the deposition of respondent taken by her lawyer, Alan Johnston (Tr. p.159, LA, 9-20, 
22-25, p.160, L.1-4). 
Appellant admitted that RWP is still publishing Shady Healing and that Shady 
Healing is still available for purchase on Amazon. Appellant stated that she still is the co-
owner, co-manager, and registered agent ofRWP. (Tr. p.160, L.14-25; p.161, L.1). 
Appellant confirmed that Shady Healing accused respondent of deceit, trickery, 
lies, false teachings, stealing, misrepresentation, fraud, cocaine, heroin use, acid and 
cultism. Appellant admits that she knew of these accusations before July 30, 2013, and 
that these accusations disparaged and defamed respondent. (Tr. p. 161, L.7-24). 
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Appellant admitted that additional excerpts from the transcript of a deposition of 
respondent taken by her lawyer in the prior lawsuit are reprinted in Sha((v Healing on pages 
337,379 and 387. (Tr. p.162, Ll-15). 
Appellant stated that any references to Tyra in Shady Healing are her. She admitted that 
page 380 of Shady Healing refers to some of respondent's interrogatory responses taken out of 
her prior lawsuit with respondent which were in appellant's possession. She stated that there 
are references to her attorney, Alan Johnston, on pages 388, 391, and 392. She agreed that the 
excerpts from the deposition of respondent in the lawsuit which they had pending before the 
agreement came from her attorney. (Tr. p.162, L16-17, 20-25; p.163, L.16-25, p.164, L.l, 11-
16). 
Appellant acknowledged that she provided Lindsey Stock all of the information in 
pages 337,379,380,381,388,389,391, and 392. Appellant admitted that all of the pages 
referred to in Shady Healing had excerpts from depositions and the medical records of her prior 
law suit with respondent. Appellant also confirmed that the above infoTIl1ation was 
disseminated to third parties after July 20,2010 (Tr. p. 165, L. 3-7,16-25). Appellant 
estimated that less than thirty (30) copies of Shady Healing have sold since July 30,2010 and 
Shady Healing is priced at $29.95. She testified that there is money in the RWP's account from 
sales of Shady Healing. (Tr. p.166, LA-8, 16-25, p.167, L.1-7). 
At trial, appellant was reminded of about her prior deposition testimony, which reads in 
relevant part: 
Q: So you assumed since you hurried and printed Shady Healing 
before your agreement that it would be okay to sell Shady 
Healing after the agreement? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: Well, if allegations of deceit and trickery, lies, false teachings, 
stealing, misrepresentation, fraud, disrespect, cocaine use 
and cultism, if those are sent out to the public after July 30tb 
don't you understand the harm that they may do? 
A: Nope. 
Q: So you cared about whether those words would harm Vianna 
after you sent them out? 
A: No, I did not. 
Q: Didn't it bother You? 
A: Didn't bother me. 
Q: It was intended that Shady Healing, would be read by others; 
wasn't it'? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Shady Healing, bad all the harmful words that I've talked to 
you all morning about? 
A: Yes. 
Q: So is it your whole defense that someone else did this and you 
had no connection to it? 
A: Pretty much. 
(Tr. p.l72, L.l 0-12, 18-23; p.l73, L.2-9, 14-25, p.174, L.1). 
At trial, appellant testified in particular as to her exact knowledge of the contents of Shady 
Healing as follows: 
Q: You were aware of all of the excerpts from the depositions in 
tbat lawsuit contained in that Shady Healing; isn't that true? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You knew that all the information was meant to be 
confidential regarding all matters, documents, medical 
records pertaining to the lawsuit in CV-2009-1852, you knew 
that; didn 't you? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: Excerpts from the lawsuit, medical records, they were all 
disseminated to the public after July 30th, 2010; weren't 
they? 
A: Yes, they're still available. 
(Tr. p.174, L.5-7, 10-15,17-20). 
Appellant admitted that she did not investigate any of the allegations before Shady 
Healing was published. She said that she had no proof regarding the allegations of deceit, 
trickery, lies, false teachings, stealing, misrepresentation, fraud, disrespect for the law, 
cocaine, heroin usc and cultism. Appellant agreed that Shady Healing was not published by 
accident and that she intended for it to be published. Appellant absolutely admitted that 
allegations against someone with regard to the accusations described above would tend to 
disgrace and degrade the person the accusations are alleged against. (Tr. p.175, 4-9, 17-25, 
p.176, L.1-6). 
As to the second paragraph of the fifth defense ofthe answer filed by appellant, she 
testified that the allegations made against respondent in Shady Healing as referenced in 
respondent's complaint were expressions of her opinion. (Tr. p.176, L.23-25; p.177, L.16-
21). 
Appellant admitted that she had planned to distribute Shady Healing after the 
agreement, and reiterated that Amazon is currently distributing Shady Healing. (Tr. 
p.178, L5-11, 13-15,21-24; p.179, L.6-9). 
Appellant verified she is a fifty (50) percent co-owner ofRWP. She financed Shady 
Healing with her own money. Appellant's documents, emails, and deposition testimony from 
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her lawsuit with respondent all show up in Shady Healing which is still being distributed 
since July 30,2010. (Tr. p.20l, L.S-7, lS-2S; p.202, L.1-6). 
Appellant admitted that she helped R WP publish Shady Healing by providing 
payment to the printing company for printing Shady Healing and that R WP was not an entity 
until July 22,2010. The money that comes into RWP from the sales of Shady Healings are 
deposited into an account which appellant has the right to receive one-half of an equal share. 
(Tr. p.206, L.22-24; p.208, L.S-7, 10-11, 16-2S; p.209, L.2-4). 
RWP'S bank statements record when deposits were made for sales of Shady Healing 
from September, 2010 to December, 2011. The bank statements specifically reflect deposits 
for Shady Healing sales on page 6, 7, and on page 17 from Amazon.com during that period. 
Appellant admitted that on October 26th 2010 she deposited $SOO of her personal money into 
RWP's bank account. (Tr. p.211, L.21-22; p.212, L.S-11, p.213, L.4-12; p.214, LA-lO; p. 
21S, L.3-6, 11 19). 
Appellant's name is on the bank account for R WP as a signatory owner. The bank 
account has approximately one thousand twenty-three dollars ($1,023) which was money that 
had been earned by RWP since July 30,2010. (Tr. p.280, L.23-2S; p.281, L.S-9, 23-2S; 
p.282, L.18-25; p.283, L.20-21). RWP has no other assets. (Tr. p.176, L.15-2l). 
Appellant sent Shady Healing to her attorney, Alan Johnston, who was present at the 
settlement mediation with appellant and respondent. Appellant admitted she had read Shady 
Healing prior to mediation, knew exactly what it contained and intended Shady Healing to be 
distributed after the time she signed the agreement promising she would not say anything 




ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT 
BREACHED HER AGREEMENT WITH RESPONDENT? 
1. "VAS APPELLANT SUBSTANTIALLY INVOLVED IN DISSE]\1INATll'JG 
DISPARAGING, DEFAMATORY OR 
NEGATIVE STATEMENTS ABOUT RESPONDENT AND 
DISCLOSING ANY MATTERS, DOCUMENTS AND 
MEDICAL RECORDS REGARDING RESPONDENT WHICH 
WERE DISTRIBUTED AFTER APPELLANT AGREED NOT 
TODOSO? 
2. DID APPELLANT PERSONALLY PAY FOR THE PRINTING 
OF "SHADY HEALING"? 
3. WAS RIGHT WAY PUBLISHING FINANCED, MANAGED, 
AND CONTROLLED BY APPELLANT BEFORE, DURING 
AND AFTER JULY 30, 2010? 
4. DID i\PPELLANT PROFIT FROM SALES OF 
"SHADY HEALING" AFTER JULY 30, 2010? 
B. WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT RESPONDENT 
SUFFERED ACTUAL DAMAGES OF $6,250.00 
C. WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT THAT (1) APELLANT'S CONDUCT WAS 
INTENTIONAL, EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS AND (2) PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
OF $50,000 WERE APPROPRIATE? 
D. WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT? 
V. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
An award of attorney fees may be granted if authorized by statute or contract. 
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Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 P. 3d 723 (2003); Idaho Code § 12-121; Hellar v. 
Cenamlsa 106 Idaho 571, 682 P. 2d 524 (1984). 
Paragraph eleven (11) of the appellant's agreement with respondent entitles the prevailing 
party to attorney fees and costs for litigation under the agreement. (Exhibit 1; Appendix 1). 
An award of attorney fees may be granted on appeal to the prevailing party under Idaho 
Code § 12-121 and LAR. 41 "when this court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal has 
been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Minich v. Gem State 
Developers, Inc. 99 Idaho 911, 591 P. 2d 1078 (1978). 
"Attorney fees are awardable if an appeal does not more than simply invite an appellate 
court to second guess the trial court on conflicting evidence." Sun Valley Shamrock Res. Inc v. 
Travelers Lending Co. 118 Idaho 116, 120, 794 P. 2d 1389, 1393 (1990); Sprinkler Irrigation Co. 
v. John Deere Ins. Co. 139 Idaho 667 P. 3d 667 (2004). 
An appellate court may award fees and costs against a party and it's attorney who have 
violated LAR. 11.1. Macleod v. Deed 126 Idaho 669, 671, 889 P. 2d 103, 105 (Ct. App, 1995). 
An attorney who fails to conduct reasonable inquiry that the appeal be well-grounded in fact and 
warranted by existing law has violated LAR. 11.1. Sprinkler Irrigation Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co. 
139 Idaho 667 P. 3d 667 (2004). 
All of appellant's arguments on appeal serve only to rehash or reweigh the facts and 
indulge in a fiction that not even the appellant or her witness testified to without legal authority or 
reason to vary from existing law. Appellant and her witness, Lindsey Stock, testified that the 
payment for the printing of the Shady Healing occurred prior to the formation ofRWP. However, 
appellant argues that "Right Way Publishing paid for the printing of the book, Shady Healing, 
before July 30,2010," (see Appellant's Briefp. 17). The book printing was paid for on July 21, 
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2010 according to appellant, Lindsey Stock, and appellant's exhibits E and F. RWP did not legally 
exist on July 21,2013, and therefore, could not have paid for the printing. 
As the facts above show and the legal arguments below reflect, attorneys fees and costs and 
appeal should be awarded under all the above standards. 
VI. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. Standard of Review 
The scope of judicial review on appeal was aptly addressed by Justice Boyle, writing: 
"In an appellate review of a trial court decision we must always keep 
in mind the respective roles assigned to the courts. At the trial level 
the trier of fact, in this case the district court judge, is the arbiter of 
conflicting evidence. Rankin v. Rankin 107 Idaho 621, 691 P.2d 
1236 (1984). It is the province of the trier of fact to weigh 
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of 
witnesses. LR.C.P. 52(a); Pointer v. Johnson 107 Idaho 1014, 695 
p.2d 399 (1985); Glenn v. Gotzinger, 106 Idaho 109,675 P.2d 1333 
(1982);Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021,772 P.2d 228 (Ct.App. 
1988). In view of this role, the trial court's findings of fact will be 
liberally construed in favor of the judgment entered. Rueth v. State 
103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982); Jensen v. Bledsoe 100 Idaho 
84, 593 P.2d 988 (1979). Trial court's findings and conclusions 
which are based on substantial although conflicting evidence will not 
be disturbed on appeal. The credibility and weight to be given 
evidence is in the province of the trier of fact, and the findings made 
by the trial judgment will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. 
Pointer v. Johnson, 107 Idaho 1014, 695 P.2d 399 *1392 (1985); 
Macneil v. Minidoka Memorial Hosp., 108 Idaho 588, 701 P.2d 208 
(1985). It is with these guiding principles in mind that we undertake 
our review ofthe instant appeal." 
Sun Valley Shamrock v. Travelers Leasing, 118 Idaho 116,794 p.2d 1389.(1990) 
A. 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT 
BREACHED HER AGREEMENT WITH RESPONDENT. 
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District Judge Jon J. Shindurling entered the following findings fact regarding respondent's 
breach of contract claim against appellant: 
"Shady Healing is a book written by Lindsey Stock, who is the former daughter-in-
law of Vianna. Shady Healing was published by RWP, LLC. Shady Healing 
contains disparaging, defaming, or otherwise negative comments about 
Vianna. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 3; Trial Tr. 161:19-24. An invoice from Sunrise 
Press LLC, admitted at trial as Defendants' Exhibit F, show that Shady 
Healing was printed on July 21, 2012 and was paid for by April Fano. The 
Articles of Organization of Right Way Publishing, LLC, admitted as Defendants' 
Exhibit C at trial; show that R\VP, LLC was formed on July 22, 2010. April's 
home address is listed as the company's designated office and its principal place of 
business. The company's registered agent is listed at April Fano and her home 
address is again listed as the company's registered office. The company is co-
managed and its two managers are April Fano and Lindsey Stock. Shac(v Healing 
has been sold to the public since the Release Agreement was entered and is still 
available for purchase on Amazon. Trial Tr. 161: 16- i 8. Before the Reiease 
Agreement was signed, April provided Lindsey Stock with emails and portions 
of depositions from her previous lawsuit with Vianna. Trial TR. 193:3-195:23. 
April denied giving Lindsey Stock any medical records. Trial Tr. 160:11-13. 
April knew about the contents of Shady Healing before she signed the Release 
Agreement. April testified that she intended to publish Shady Healing and 
intended that Shady Healil1g would be read by others. Trial Tr. 173:21-176:1." 
R. Vol. I, pp. 44-45. 
Based upon the trial court's findings of fact and the above record the trial court 
entered the conclusions of law as follows: 
"Paragraph 8 of the Release Agreement requires April to keep confidential all 
matters, documents and medical records pertaining to the previous lawsuit between 
her and Vianna. Paragraph 9 of the Release Agreement prohibits April and Vi anna 
from making any disparaging, defaming, or otherwise negative comments regarding 
each other to any third party as of the date of the Release Agreement. There is no 
question that Shady Healing contains disparaging, defaming, or otherwise negative 
comments about Vianna. In addition, Shady Healing contains documents that April 
gave to Lindsey Stock that are from April's previous lawsuit with Vi anna. 
Therefore, the only question before the Court is whether April's involvement in the 
publishing of Shady Healing combined with the fact that Shady Healing was sold to 
the public after the Release Agreement was entered violated paragraphs 8 and 9 of 
the Release Agreement. 
April's involvement was substantial, and included: (1) giving Lindsey Stock 
emails and portions of depositions from her previous lawsuit with Vianna; (2) 
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paying for Shady Healing to be printed; (3) forming R\VP, LLC together with 
Lindsey Stock to publish Shady Healing; and (4) receiving bank statement for 
RWP, LLC. Based on April's substantial involvement in publishing Shady 
Healing, it is the determination of this Court that April is responsible for the 
comments expressed in Shady Healing and for the documents contained in 
Shady Healing from the previous lawsuit with Vianna. This includes 
comments made by April under the name Tyra and those made by the author. 
Based on the evidence before the Court, Shady Healing would not have beeu 
published but for April's substantial involvement. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of 
the Release Agreement do not excuse April from liability. As Shady Healing 
was sold after the date of the Release Agreement, and continues to be sold 
today, April has breached the Release Agreement by making disparaging, 
defaming, or otherwise negative comments about Vianna and by failing to keep 
confidential documents related to their previous lawsuit. 
In making this determination, it is not necessary for this Court to analyze the 
arguments made by Viam1a regarding a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing: or anv alter eg:o arg:uments re£ardim!: Amil and RWP. LLC. 
"-' .t '"-' '--' '-"......, J. ~ 
The Court recognizes the arguments made by April that her actions in forming 
R WP, LLC and paying for the printing of Shady Healings were not improper 
because she did not anticipate settling her case on July 30, 2010. While that may be 
tme, it is not an excuse fur failing to disclose the existence of Shady Healing once it 
became clear that she would agree to the requirements contained in the Release 
Agreement. 
The Court simply cannot allow April to fraudulently enter into a release 
agreement and agree not to make certain comments or disclose eertain 
documents when she knows that a Shady Healing she helped publish and paid 
to print would soon be for sale to the public doing those same things. April did 
nothing to disclose the existence of Shady Healing and did nothing to attempt 
to stop it from being sold to the public." 
R. Vol. I, pp. 46-47. 
1. 
APPELLANT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY INVOLVED IN DISSEMINATING 
DISPARAGING, DEFAMATORY OR NEGATIVE STATEMENTS 
ABOUT RESPONDENT AND DISCLOSING ANY MATTERS, 
DOCillv1ENTS MEDICAL RECORDS REGARDING RESPONDENT 
WHICH WERE DISTRIBUTED AFTER APPELLANT AGREED NOT TO 
DO SO. 
Appellant supplied Lindsey Stock with appellant's emails to respondent, respondent and 
her attorney's degrading opinions of respondent, respondent's deposition transcripts and 
25 
discovery from the defamation suit respondent sought to settle. Appellant read the book and 
shared it with her attorney. 
She personally paid for the printing of the book which included the infoill1ation above 
she personally provided to Lindsey Stock. Shady Healing included excerpts from respondent's 
medical records which were produced to appellant in their prior lawsuit. 
Two days after appellant the settlement agreement was signed with respondent, appellant 
hand delivered the five hundred (500) printed copies of the book to Lindsey Stock for 
pUblication and distribution to the pUblic. 
Appellant disguised herself in the book as the woman named as "Tyra" as a source of 
certain defamatory information aimed at respondent. 
Appellant created the LLC, RWP attempting to hide her true involvement in the 
publication of the book. 
She co-owned and co-managed RWP to control the book. She deposited her own 
personal money into RWP's account. 
RWP received proceeds from book sales which appellant is entitled to. 
2. 
APPELLANT PERSONALLY PAID FOR THE PRINTING OF 
THE "SHADY HEALING". 
On July 21,2010, an estimate from Sunrise Press, LLC was provided to April Fano 
[Appellant], aprilfano@msn.com to print five htmdred (500) books in the sum of four thousand 
seven hundred eighty dollars ($4,780). (See Appellant's Exhibit E; Appendix 2). On this same 
day of July 21,2010, an invoice was provided, bill to RWP as paid in full, per April Fano 
[Appellant]. (See Exhibit F, Appendix 4). 
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On July 22,2010, one day after the printing of the book was paid for, April Fano, 
appellant, signed an article of organization for Right Way Publishing, LLC received by the 
Utah State Div. of Corp. on July 22,2010. (See Exhibit 4; Appendix 2). 
RWP was not fonned until after the printing bill was paid for by appellant personally. 
RWP was not legally in existence until after the printing bill was in existence. 
As a matter of law, RV/P could not have paid for the printing bill. As a matter of fact, 
April Fano admitted to paying for the printing (See Exhibit E; Appendix 3). Lindsey Stock, 
Appellant's co-manager and author of Shady Healing testified that the money for the printing 
of the book came from April Fano, prior to the day that appellant and Stock formed Right Way 
Publishing. (TR. P. 255, L.5-11). 
However, appellant affirmatively represented to this Court that RWP, LLC paid for the 
printing of the book Shady Healing before July 30,2013 at page 17 of her opening brief, which 
her attorney, Alan Johnston signed on page 33. 
3. 
RWP WAS FINANCED, MANAGED, AND CONTROLLED BY APPELLANT 
BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER JULY 30,2010. 
Benefiting from her LLC's transactions are a factor in the alter-ego doctrine. Surety 
Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc. 95 Idaho 599, 574 P. 2d 554 (1973). 
The Supreme Court addressed the application ofthe alter ego doctrine to prevent 
injustice in Tom Nakamura, Inc v. G.&G. Produce Company, Inc., 93 Idaho 182,457 P.2d 422 
(1969) and mled that: 
'We hold that the judgment of the trial court dismissing the actions as 
to Lonnie and June Garrison, as individuals, was erroneous on such 
portion of the trial court's decision is reversed. As this Court said in 
Hayhurst v. Boyd., 50 Idaho 752, 300 P.895 (1931): 
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'To warrant casting aside the legal fiction of 
distinct corporate existence *** it must also be 
shown that there is such a unity of interest and 
ownership that the individuality of such 
corporation and such person has ceased; and it 
must further appear from the facts that the 
observance of the fiction of separate existence 
would, under the circumstances, sanction a fraud 
or promote injustice.' 
Accord, Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879 
(1966), and Metz v. Hawkins, 64 Idaho 386,133 P.2d 721 (1943). 
It is undisputed in the record before us that the Garrisons, as 
individuals, were in effect the alter ego of G. & G. corporation or 
vice versa, and that there was such a unity of ownership and interest 
between the individuals and the corporation as to make them 
indistinguishable. The assets, interest and dehts of the Garrisons 
and G. & G. corporation were so intertwined as to make the 
distinction between them as individuals and as a corporation 
merely a distinction without a difference. We hold, therefore, 
that the corporate entity in this case must be disregarded to 
prevent injustice and that June and Lonnie Garrison should be 
held personally liable for these debts contracted in the name of 
the corporation. 
As herein mentioned, the district court dismissed the actions as to 
Max Lehman personally. There is nothing in the record before us 
which in any way indicates that Lehman was privy to any of the 
transactions bringing about the indebtedness of the corporation to 
Nakamura and/or Warnock. The record is devoid of any indication 
that Lehman personally benefited in any way from any of the 
transactions in question or had any contact with G. & G. corporation 
or with plaintiffs or either of them. It is, therefore, obvious that the 
trial court was correct in its action in dismissing Lehman as a 
defendant in the action and such portion of the judgment of the trial 
court is affirmed. 
The stipulated facts indicate that \Vilford and Betty Hess were the 
sole stockholders of both Hess Distributing and Rose Chapel and 
that Wilford Hess was the president and manager of both 
corporations. While that fact would not be conclusive evidence that 
Wilford and Betty Hess were doing business as individuals, it 
indicates the degree of control over both corporations which the 
Hesses possessed. In addition to possessing absolute control over the 
management and operation of the corporations, the parties stipulated 
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that the Hesses operated both the distributing company and the 
mortuary business without regard for corporate procedures and 
formalities ... 
Further evidence of the fact that the separate identities of the Hesses 
and the corporations had ceased can be seen in Wilford Hess's 
deposition concerning the relationship between Hess Distributing 
and Rose Chapel wherein he stated, 'One helps the other.' Indeed, 
one did help the other. Hess Distributing provided funds to cover 
labor costs incurred in the construction of the mortuary. 
'Wilford and Betty Hess used the two corporations merely 
as a conduit through which to conduct their personal business 
ventures and that the separate identities of Wilford and Betty 
Hess and the corporations had ceased." 
95 Idaho at 602-603, 574 P.2d at 597-598. 
In Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 845, 761 P.2d 1169, 1197 (1988) our 
Supreme Court addressed additional factors were established for applying the alter ego 
doctrine to prevent formation of a subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud as follows: 
"In Idaho, we ... have recognized that corporate identity may be 
disregarded where an individual had such a unity or interest and 
ownership that separate personalities of the corporation and 
individual no longer exist and where, if the acts at issue are treated 
as those of a corporation, and inequitable result would ensue. Chick 
v. Tomlinson, 96 Idaho 483, 531 P.2d 573 (1975); Surety Life Ins. 
Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599, 514 P.2d 594 
(1973). Factors which influence whether the corporate veil will 
be pierced (and a subsidiary deemed an 'alter ego' ofthe parent) 
include the obvious under-capitalization of the subsidiary; the 
failure of either the parent or subsidiary to adhere to corporate 
formalities; and the formation of the subsidiary to perpetrate a 
fraud. United States v. Jon-T Chemical, Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 
1985); Middendorfv. Fugua Industries, Inc., 623 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 
1980). 
Regardless of the rubric under which liability is found (i.e. 
recognition of corporateness or not), the courts have tended to look 
for factors denoting the existence of 'control,' 'domination,' or 
'unity of purpose,' or subsidiary as a 'mere instrumentality.' 
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Appellant and Lindsey both have conspicuous common interests or motivations. Both 
were extremely upset with Respondent and her son, Josh Opfar. Lindsey Stock was hurt and 
angry with Josh Opfar for leaving her for another woman and blames Vianna and ThetaHealing 
(Exhibit 3, p.I-492). Appellant was upset with Josh over money she invested and lost with him. 
Appellant was upset with Vianna for not paying her back for Josh's debt and rejecting 
Appellant's pressure to promote April's multi-level vitamin marketing business through 
Viam1a's teachers and students. Appellant and Lindsey's anger united in hate, produced the 
malicious, vengeful accusations appearing in Shady Healing. 
Apellant supplied respondent's confidential infonnation and Appellants's derogative e-
mails referring to Respondent over to Lindsey which she included in Shady Healing. Appellant 
read Shady Healing and had her attomeys read it. Appellant personally arranged with Sunrise 
Press to print five hundred (500) copies of Shady Healing. And Appellant used her own, 
personal money to pay for the printing of Shady Healing. 
The day after Appellant personally paid for the printing, she and Lindsey fonned "Right 
Way" Publishing, LLC as co-owners and co-managers, listing Appellant as registered agent 
and her home as the address for their LLC. Appellant opened and controls the bank account for 
her LLC in which proceeds of Shady Healing sales were deposited. 
Appellant's co-owner and co-manager, Lindsey, began distributing the Shady Book on 
the intemet and through Amazon.com. April's LLC's bank statements reflect (1) a deposit of 
$500.00 of April's personal funds which she deposited and commingled in the account to pay 
for her LLC's expenses in October of 201 0, and (2) deposits for the book sales from October of 
2010 through May of 20 11. April's LLC recorded sales which she has a one-half interest in. 
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The balance of her LLC account as of November, 2011 was approximately eleven hundred 
dollars ($1100). 
Appellant's LLC was undercapitalized from its inception. The only funds Appellant's 
LLC banked was from book sales and a $500.00 deposit from Appellants's personal funds. Its 
assets are $1100 and il1sufficient to address allyT meaningful judgment for 1-1er COlldllCt. 
Appellant fom1cd the LLC to perpetrate a fraud upon Respondent by (1) pretending to 
bargain in good faith by promising not to do any ofthe things she was in fact planning to do 
and (2) trying to cover up her involvement to Shady Healing with a supposed separate entity. 
She had her partner, Lindsey; remove her name from Shady Healing by using the pseudonym 
of Tyra when Appellant was speaking in the book. 
Corporate, LLC formalities were not observed. Appellant personally arranged for the 
printing and paid for the printing of Shady Healing before she formed an LLC. April 
comingled her personal funds in her LLC's account which she controls. 
The sole purpose of her LLC was to market the book she could not do personally. 
Appellant, Lindsey, and Appellant's LLC's common interest were united. Appellant's LLC was 
the subterfuge she employed to evade her contract with Respondent. Justice requires that 
Appellant be held personally liable for the instmmentalities of alter ego LLC. 
4. 
APPELLANT DID PROFIT FROM SALES OF "SHADY HEALINO" 
AFTER JULY 30, 2010? 
Appellant is a co-owner of R WP and its bank account, which received deposits from 
the sales of Shady Healing after July 30, 2013. There is eleven hundred dollars ($1100) in 
profit for the co-owner. 
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B. 
THERE WERE FINDINGS OF SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT 
RESPONDENT SUFFERED ACTUAL DAMAGES OF $6,250.00. 
"A substantial or material breach of contract is one which touches the fundamental 
purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the parties in entering into the contract. 
Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 740, 536 P. 2d *511 729,735 (1975); see also 
Mountain Restaurant Corp. v. Parkcenter Mall Assocs., 122 Idaho 261, 265,833 P. 2d 119, 123 
(Ct.App 1992)," Erwin Conty. Co. v. Van Ordem, 125 Idaho 695 at 699-700,8740 .2d506 at 
509-511 (Sup. Crt 2002). 
"The requirement for recovery is that the damages be proved with reasonable certainty 
and second that they were within the contemplation of the parties. Brown's Tie & Lumber v. 
Chicago Title, 115 Idaho 56, 61, 764 P. 2d 423,428 (1988) (citing Nelson v. World Wide 
Lease, Inc., 110 Idaho 369, 378, 716 P.2d 513,522 (Ct.App.1986»," Cuddy Mountain 
Concrete, Inc. v. Citadel Constmction, Inc, 121 Idaho 220 at 225,824 P.2d 157 at 156 (Crt. 
App 1992). 
"Damages recoverable for breach of contract are those that arise naturally from the 
breach and are reasonably foreseeable. Appel v. Lepage, 135 Idaho 133, 15 P .3d 1141 (2000). 
Damages need not have been precisely and specifically foreseeable, but only such as were 
reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time they contracted. Id.: Suitts v. First Sec. Bank 
ofIdaho, N.A.. 110 Idaho 15,22, 713 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1985)," Silver Creek Computers, Inc. 
v. Petra, Inc, 136 Idaho 879 at 884, 42 P.3d 672 at 677 (2002). 
Respondent paid twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500) to appellant under the 
agreement which provided (1) mutual release of the parties' claims, (2) mutual promise not to 
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disparage or defame each other, (3) mutual promises to remove any references to each other for 
the future and (4) a promise not to disclose medical records or documents or documents from 
their suit. 
Appellant substantially, materially, and maliciously breached two of the above four 
essential elements oftlle agreement. Certainly, it '.vould be within the contemplation of 
appellant that if she failed to perform her promises, that the money she received for that would 
be returned to respondent. It would likewise be reasonable for respondent to receive money 
she paid for something bargained for but not received. 
The trial court determined that respondent's damages were six thousand two hundred 
fifty dollars ($6, 250) which is roughly half of the consideration respondent paid appellant and 
the part of purchase price appellant did not earn because of her breach of contract. The award 
was clearly foreseeable and reasonably related to appellant's breach of two of the fundamentals 
purposes of the agreement. 
Appellant's conduct shattered the covenant of good faith and fail implied in every 
contract. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration Inc .. 134 Idaho 738, 9 P. 3d 1204. 
c. 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT (1) RESPONDENTS 
CO~T)UCT WAS INTENTIONAL, EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS AND (2) PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES WERE APPROPRIATE. 
On the respondent's claim for punitive damages, the trial court ruled that: 
"First, the Court finds that April's substantial involvement in the 
publishing of Shady Healing coupled with her not disclosing the book at 
mediation and the book being sold after the Release Agreement was intentional 
conduct by April. April testified at trial that she intended to publish the book 
and intended that the book would be read by others .... April paid for and 
published the book Shady Healing, which contains countless disparaging, 
defaming, or otherwise negative comments about Vianna and documents from 
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April and Vianna's previous lawsuit that were provided to the author by April. 
Nine days later, April promised not to make any disparaging, defaming, or 
negative comment about Vianna and to keep confidential documents related to 
the previous lawsuit between her and Vi anna. She never disclosed the existence 
of Shady Healing. She did not do anything to try and stop the book from being 
sold to the pUblic. She did nothing, as she assumed that because the book was 
published and printed before the Release Agreement, it would be okay to sell 
the book after the Release Agreement. Trial Tr. 172: 18-173: 1. Breaching a 
contract in this manner is extreme and outrageous. It is even more extreme 
and outrageous in this situation because the Release Agreement was a 
contract that settled all claims which were pending before the court in a 
previous lawsuit between April and Vianna. April promised not to make 
and disparaging, defaming, or negative comments about Vianna and to 
keep confidential certain documents and received substantial consideration 
for those promises while knowing the entire time that a book she paid to 
have printed would soon be sold and would make countless comments that 
she was prohibited from making and disclose documents she was required 
to keep confidentiaL .. As discussed above, April's conduct in this case was 
outrageous. April knew at the mediation that she had funded and helped 
publish Shady Healing. The book was printed nine days before the 
mediation. Aprils admits that her book contains countless comments in 
violations of the Release Agreement and contains documents from a 
previous lawsuit between Vianna and April, both of which are a violation 
of the Release Agreement April agreed to and signed. April did all of this 
knowing that this book, which violated the Release Agreement she was 
signing, would be sold to the public after the agreement was entered. As 
explained above, April's conduct is even more extreme and outrageous in this 
situation because the Release Agreement was a contract that settled all claims 
that were pending before the court in a previous lawsuit between April and 
Vianna. April's conduct was an "extreme deviation from reasonable standards 
of conduct" and was performed with "a disregard for its likely consequences." 
As such, punitive damages are appropriate in this case. The Court award 
Vianna $50,000.00 in punitive damages .... Punitive damages may be awarded 
when: "there has been an injury to the plaintiff from an act which is an extreme 
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was 
performed by the defendant with an understanding of or a disregard for its 
likely consequences ... " Linscott v. Rainier Life Ins. Co. 100 Idaho 854, 606 
P.2d 958 (1980). 
CR. pp. 53-54) In Linscott, supra, the insurance company defendant had unilaterally changed 
terms, wrongfully attempted to rescind policies, and refused to pay valid claims, reSUlting in a 
proper award for punitive damages. 
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In Barlow v. International Harvester Co .. 95 Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102 (1974), this Court 
upheld an award of punitive damages where the defendant's agent contaeted plaintiffs business 
partner and made false statements that the plaintiff had misappropriated funds and was (1) 
incapable of managing the business, (2) a liar, (3) thief, (4) and should be put in jail. 
In Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897,904-05665 P. 2d 661,668-69 
(1983), and; this Court reminded us of the measure of punitive damages, in its dissent as follows: 
We hold punitive damage awards are in the first instance a jury decision, 
subj ect to the trial court's authority to modify or overturn that jury verdict as 
a matter of law. Such is no novel approach to the appellate treatment of a 
damage issue. See Boise Dodge, supra; Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 
463,220 P.2d 682 (1950); Hom v. Boise City Canal Co., 7 Idaho 640, 65 P. 
145 (1901); T.R.CP. 59(a)(5). 'Ve have consistently held that "punitive 
damages are be their very nature incapable of definite ascertainment and 
cannot be governed or measured by any precise standards." Cox v. 
Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 688, 496 P. 2d 687. Pmdential Federal Savings & 
Loan Ass'n v. Johnson, 93 Idaho 850, 476 P. 2d 786 (1970). "Thus the tme 
basis for an award of one amount of punitive damages as opposed to another 
amount lies in the overall appraisal of the circumstances of the case." Boise 
Dodge, Supra, 92 Idaho 908,453, P.2d 557. 
In Idaho, "An award of punitive damages will be sustained on appeal only 
when it is shown that the defendant acted in a manner that was an "extreme 
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was 
performed by the defendant with an understanding of or disregard for its 
likely consequences." Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest 100 Idaho 
851,606 P. 2d 955. The justification for punitive damages must be that the 
defendant acted with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether the state 
be telmed "malice, oppression, fraud, or gross negligence" (Morrison v. 
Quality Produce, Inc. 92 Idaho 448, 444 P. 2d 409 (1968)); "malice, 
oppression, wantonness (Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho 171, 118 P. 2d 729 
(1941)); or simply "deliberate or willful (White v. Doney, 82 Idaho 217, 351 
P. 2d 380 (1960)). See generally Linscott 100 Idaho 858, 606 P. 2d 962; 
Thompson v. Dalton, 95 Idaho 785, 788, 520 P. 2d 240, 243 (1974). 
First of all, when parties are entering a contract, it is neither a normal or reasonable standard 
of conduct to be actively and secretly working on a way to breach a contract before, during, and 
after the contract as appellant has done. To do so was extremely bad faith and a galaxy far, far, 
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away from fair dealing or nornlal standards of conduct. April absolutely admits that she did not 
care how Shady Healing would harm Vianna. 
The law defines outrageous as an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct of 
an ordinary person. Webster's Dictionary defines outrageous as "monstrous, heinous, atrocious, 
mean, enormously or flagrantly bad," stating "something outrageous violates even the lowest 
standard of what is right or decent" ... (Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, p. 585 (1978). 
What more malicious things can be said about a person that saying (1) a person lies, steals, 
deceives, misrepresents, commits fraud, practices occultism, uses cocaine and heroin, and 
prostitutes themselves to buy drugs; and (2) a person's friends come up dead, infelTing that the 
person is a murderer. 
Appellant callously, intentionally, and recklessly helped publish a book without ever 
verifying the truth or falsity of these telTible, disparaging words. She did so after promising she 
would not while accepting ample compensation for her promise. She read the book and knew of 
the severity of accusations made. In fact, she supplied information printed in the book after she 
agreed not to reveal this information. Both she and her attorney were quoted in the book. She 
spoke under the alias of Tyra to hide her identity. 
How much more devious can one get than to go into a settlement meeting knowing of the 
atrocious allegations contained in a book the person is promoting and promise to another person's 
face that you will not defame her, then sign, accept money, and thereafter, publish extremely 
hurtful words about that person behind their back? 
Appellant's aggregious behavior cries out for an award of damages to deter her from 
further outrageous and malicious behavior. Ten times respondent's actual damages is a reasonable 
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amount to give appellant an appreciation of how seriously wrong her behavior was and how 
quickly she must stop publication of this malicious book. 
D. 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT. 
Attomey fees may be granted if authorized by statue or contract, Bellar v. Cenarrusa 
106 Idaho 571, 682 P. 2d 524 (1984). The party seeking fees under contract must point to the 
provision which it relies upon for authority for such an award Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 
364, 79 P. 3d 723 (2003). 
Paragraph 11 ofthe appellant and respondent agreement provides that: "Tn the event of 
litigation relating to this agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to attomey fees and 
costs." (Exhibit 1; Vol 1. p. 73, Appendix 1). 
An award ofattomey fees may be based on IRCP 54 (e)(1) under Idaho Code § 12-121 
if it appears "from the facts presented to it that the case was brought, pursued, or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation," Sun Valley Shopping v. Idaho Power 119 
Idaho 87, 90, 203 P. 2d 993,996 (1991). "The sole question [under Rule 54 (e)(I)] is whether 
the losing party's position is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation" Swenson v. Hemmann 119 Idaho 497, 498-99, 777 P. 2d 269,270-71 
(1989). 
Respondent was the prevailing party by any measure. The paramount issue of breach 
of contract and substantive issues of punitive damages was resoundingly resolved in 
respondent's favor. Respondent originally sought in excess of seventy-two thousand five 
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hundred dollars ($72,500) in her complaint and was awarded a final judgment of eight-four 
thousand four hundred thirty-six dollars and seventy cents ($84,436.70). 
Appellant's assertion of unclean hands was easily discarded by the trial court as 
respondent performed her pali under the agreement by removing any references to appellant 
from her website. (R. Vol 1. pp. 47-48) 
Appellant's superficial attempt to claim that had someone other than her disparaged and 
defamed respondent and disclosed respondent's medical records and information was 
definitively not supported by the facts or the law. 
c. 
APPELLANT DID PROFIT FROM SALES OF THE "SHADY HEALING" AFTER 
JULY 30, 2010. 
Appellant is a co-owner ofRWP and its bank account, which received deposits from 
the sales of Shady Healing after July 30,2010. Her profit is on deposit. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent's breach of contract case was well proven. Appellant's conduct was 
absolutely outrageous; the trial comis award was firmly grounded in the law and facts of the 
case. Judge Shindurling's judgment should be affirmed with fees and costs awarded to 
respondent. 
Respectfully submitted this ~~&afOctober, 2013 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on October 20l3, I served a true copy of the foregoing 
document on the attomey(s)/person(s) listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or 
by causing the same to be hand delivered. 
Attorney(s)lPerson(s) served: 
Idaho Supreme COUli 
P.O. Box 83820 
Boise, ID 83720-0020 
Vianna Stibal 
1615 Curlew Drive 
Idaho Falls, ID 83406 
Alan Johnston 
Pike Herndon Stosich & Johnston 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 








lYIUTUAL RELEASE , HOLD HARIVILESS, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND SETTLElVlENT 
AGREEMENT 
This Mutual Release, Hold Harmless, Confidential ity, and Settlement Agreement 
("Agreement") is entered by and between Vianna Stibal, Vier,na's Nature's Path, Inc., Nature's 
Path, Inc, and the ThetaHealing Institute of Knowledge, its successors in interests, assignees and 
assigns and surviving entities by acquisition (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Vi anna"), 
and April Fano ("April") as follows: 
RE CITALS 
A. Vianna and April were involved in Bonneville County Idaho District Court, Case No. 
CV -2009-1852 (hereinafter, the "Lawsuit"). Vianna brought the Lawsuit with claims for 
defamation, libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. April countersued 
with claims for fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment 
B. Vianna and April have agreed to resolve the dispute pursuant to the terms of this 
Agreement 
AGREEMENT 
In consideration of the foregoing promises, and the mutual covenants and agreements 
reflected herein, the parties to this Agreement agree as follows: 
A. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS 
1. The above-mentioned recitals are incorporated herein by reference. 
2. Neither party admits liability regarding any claim made against each other. "'--iIIIII!!IIIIIII. 
.'. 
1. RELEASE AGREEMENT 
(' • .J~' . .. 
{ i 
t '. 
) . That V ianna agrees to execute a personal guarantee for a separate judgment debt 
held by April against a third party for claims separate, distinct, and wholly unrelated to the 
claims in the Lawsuit. 
4. The Parties agree to release each other, and hold each other hannless for any act 
of the Parties which offered before the date of this Agreement, whether known or unknown. 
5. Vianna and April, for themselves, and for each, their respective heirs, executors, 
administrators, lienholders, predecessors, successors and assigns does hereby fully and forever 
remise, release and discharge one another, their related corporations, successor corporations, 
affiliated companies, investors, insurers, partnerships, partners, trusts, trustees, beneficiaries, 
heirs, personal representatives, predecessors, successors, assigns, directors, officers, employees, 
agents and attorneys, release and hold each other harmless from any and all claims, liabilities, 
actions, causes of action known and unlmown, demands, rights, damages, costs, attorneys' fees, 
loss of profit, expenses and compensation whether related or not unrelated to the Lawsuit, this 
Settlement, or any other connection between the Parties except as specifically set forth herein. 
6. Both Parties are accepting their mutual releases and agreement to hold each other 
hannless as set forth in this Agreement in consideration in dismissing their suit against each 
other solely and only based on the uncertainty ofthe legal system. 
7. April and Vianna understand and agree that this Agreement is a compromise of 
disputed claims, and that this Agreement is not to be construed as and is not an admission of 
liability on the part of the party or parties released. 
8. April and Vianna agree to keep confidential the tem1S of tills Agreement, as well 
as all matters, documents and medical records peliaining to the Lawsuit unless: 
a. Ordered to do so by a court of law, 
') I~FLFASF AGRFFMFNT 
b. Upon the request of a law enforcement office acting in his or her official 
capacity, 
c. Confidential disclosure to an accountant or tax adviser in connection with 
preparation of income tax returns or other financial documents is 
necessary; 
d. Agreed to by the parties. 
9. April and Vianna agree not to make any disparaging, defaming, or otherwise 
negative comment regarding each other to any third party as of the date of this Agreement 
forward urJeSS: 
a. Ordered to do so by a court of law, 
b. Upon the request of a lawenforcement office acting in his or her official 
capacity, 
c. Agreed to by the pm1ies. 
10. April and Vianna agree to remove any COlmnent regarding each other that is 
posted on the internet, for which each one of them has control, within 45 days of this agreement. 
April shall make a good faith etfort to have the video of Vimma posted on Vl'vVW. voutube.com 
regarding USANA removed, and will provide Vianna's attorney with a copy of any 
correspondence sent in an effort to remove said video. 
11. The confidentiality and nondisclosure requirements of this mutual release and 
hold harmless agreement shall not apply to any statements, disclosures, or other communications 
to third parties made before the date of this Agreement, whether known aT lHllQ1Own. 
3. RELEASE AGREEMENT 
12. The mutual release and hold harmless agreement shall apply to any statements, 
disclosures, or other communications to third parties made before the date of this Agreement, 
whether known or unknown. 
13. Both parties shall be responsible for their own attorney's fees and costs associated 
with the Lawsuit. 
B. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. Readin2:, Understanding: and Advisabili!y: This Agreement has been carefully 
read, and the contents hereof are known and understood by all, and it is sig11ed freely by each 
person executing this Agreement. Prior to the execution of this Agreement by each party, each 
party hereto has had the opportunity to receive independent legal advice by that party's attorneys 
with respect to the advisability of making the releases desClibed herein and with respect to the 
advisability of executing this Agreement. 
2. Representations. Except as expressly stated in this Agreement, no party hereto 
has made any statement or representation to any other party regarding any fact relied upon by the 
other party entering into this Agreement, and each party specifically does not rely upon any 
statement, representation or promise of any other party in executing this Agreement, except as 
expressly stated in this Agreement. 
3. Investi!mtions. To the extent possible, each party and its, his or her attorneys 
have made such investigation of the facts pertaining to this settlement, this Agreement, and all 
matters pertaining thereto, as they deem necessary. The parties hereto agree and acknowledge 
that they, or any of them, may hereafter discover facts different from or in addition to those they, 
or any of them, now know or believe to be true with respect to the matters released and settled 
RELEASE AGREEMENT 
) herein, and the parties specifically agree that all of the tenns of this Agreement shall be and will 
remain effective in all aspects, regardless of such different or additional facts which may be 
learned. 
4. Integration. This Agreement constitutes a single, integrated, YVTitten contract 
expressing the entire agreement of the parties hereto relative to the subject matter hereof. No 
covenants, agreements, representations, or warranties of any kind whatsoever have been made by 
any party hereto, except as specifically set forth in this Agreement All prior discussions and 
negotiations have been and are merged and integrated into, and are superseded by this 
Agreement. 
5. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with, and be 
governed by, the laws of the State ofIdaho. 
6. Further Assurances. Each of the parties hereto agrees to take such further action 
and execute all such further documents as may be necessary or appropriate in order to 
consummate the settlement and release contemplated hereby. 
7. No Assignment. The parties hereto hereby warrant and represent that they, and 
each of them, have made no assiglID1ent, voluntary or involuntary, of all or any part of the claims 
released herein to any other person or entity. 
8. Drafting. This Agreement shall be construed without regard as to which party 
drafted the Agreement, and this Agreement shall be construed as if all parties hereto participated 
equally in the drafting of the Agreement. 
9. Survival. Wherever possible, each provision of this Agreement shall be 
interpreted in such a manner as to be valid under applicable law, but if any provision of this 
Agreement shall be invalid, or prohibited thereunder, such provision shaH be ineffective to the 
5. RELEASE AGREEMENT 
extent of such prohibition without invalidating the remainder of such provision or the remaining 
provisions ofthis Agreement 
10. Confidentialij:y. Except as provided in pru:agraph 6 above, the parties hereto 
represent and agree that they will keep the terms and facts of this Settlement Agreement 
completely confidential and that they will not disclose any information concerning this 
Settlement Agreement to anyone. 
11. Attornevs' Fees and Costs. In the event of litigation relating to this Agreement, 
the prevailing party shall be entitled to attorneys) fees and costs. 
12. r nl.mterp::1rts qnd Farsimile Signatmcs. 
counterparts, and/or by facsimile signatures. 
The undersigned have read the foregoing Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement and 
full y understand it 
DATED: r!]~ 3CJ - ~QlO 
DATED: 
6. RELEASE AGREEMENT 
Vianna StibaI, Vianna's Nature's Path, Inc, 




In her individual capacity, and as president of all 
businesses listed above. 
') APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED: 
.., 
Dl\ TED: ,0 ~(J 10 
7. RELEASE AGREEMENT 
J "' -- '- r Stible, Vianna's Nature's 
Path, Inc, Nature'~Path, Inc, and the 
ThetaHeaIing Institute of Knowledge 




Attomey for April Fano 
PERSONAL GUARANTEE 
The undersigned Viarma Stibal, as Maker of this personal Guarantee, of Rigby, County of 
Jefferson, State ofIdaho, hereby guarantees payment to April Fano in the amount of Twelve 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($ 12,500) for partial satisfaction of the Default Judgment in the 
amount of $26,588.00 dated June 12,2009 held by April Fano against Joshua Opfar in April 
Fano v. Josh Opfar at aI, in the District Court of the State of Idaho, Seventh Judicial Dislrict, 
BOlmeville County, Case No. CV-2008-7144. April Fano, as Payee under this Personal 
Guarantee, shall not be required to exhaust her recourse or take any action against Maker before 
being entitled to payment by the undersigned of all amounts guaranteed. In the event Joshua 
Opfar does not pay April Fano the said $12,500.00 within 45 days form the date July 29,2010, 
Payee may enforce this guarantee against the maker. If Payee is required to bring legal action, 
she shall be entitled to her reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated with legal action and 
collection. 
In the Notice of default on the part of maker is waived and the undersigned agrees to 
remain bound in spite of any extensions, renewals, modifications, or compromises of any 
indebtedness, liability, or obligation of he maker under the temlS of the Default Judgment. 







ARTICLES OF ORGANIZ,,'\TI0N or 
RIGHT WA Y PUBLISfIING, LtC 
The undersigned .\{wagers, desiring to form a limited 1 iabiJity company (the 
"Company") pursuant to the laws of the Siate of Utah, certify as follows; 
!. The name of the Company is R[G HT WA Y PUBUSHTNG, LLC. 
/~'-.~'\ 
2. The Company's existence shall commence upon the filing dale of these Article(H8f ) 
The Company shail dissolve upon the earEer of (a) .December 31, 2l 09; or (b) the day: (ik... d 
h __ ~·-_':} 
\lembers entitied to receive 51% of the portion of the Company's Net Profits to which ivfcmtel's 
are entitkd shall sign a written agreement of dissolution; (ii) the Company is dissolved by 
judicial decree or by administrative action; (iii) the Company is not the successor company in the 
merger or consolidation of two or more companies; or (Iv) the Company faUsto !lave at least one 
member. 
3. The purposes Cl)f \vhich the Company is organized to engage m anv lawfu! 
business activities for I,.vhich limited liabi lity companies may be organilc<l pursuant to the Act 
4. The Company's designated office and its principal place of business are at 1103 S. 
Waterside Dr., SHatoga Springs, UT S4(}45. 
5. The Company's registered omCe is loc3Iea at 1103 S. \Vatel'sicie: Dr., Saratoga 
Springs, VT 84045. The Company's registered agent for service of process a1 that street address 
is APRIL FANO, 
6. The Company shall be manager-managed, and the m,wagement of the Company 
is hereby vested in its managers. Tne names and addresses of the m~magers are: APRIL Ff\NO 
and LINDSEY STOCK all at 1103 S. Waterside Dr., Saratoga Springs, UT &4045. 
7. Any contract of the Compa.ny or any deed, bill of sale. Jnor1gage, lease, contract if 
sale or other commitment of the Company purporting to bind the Company in any way or to 
conveyor encumber the interest of the Company in all or in any portion of any real or personal 
property at any time held in its name, shall be signed by any Manager on bella! f of the Company, 



























g Th.e Compmy shall be governed by a wntietl opcratJng agreement, the trons of 
wn lell shall supplement the pro'VlSlons of Utah lmv As penmt:red by sectIOn 4s..2c-003 of t1w 
Utah RCVlsed LJ.D11tOO Lfl'lbilfty Company Act. and 113 proVtded III !ho Company g openrtmg 
agreement, the membets of!:f!e Company have pennanently and una.'1!.tl1ou51y waIVed and 
elunlf'.ated, to !he mlIJUmum extent [JCmtltted by law aery \lability ohny member for the return 
of money or property to the Company which the member rightfully received as a dl5tnbuhon of 
part Of all of the members capnai account. 
We; ct::ruij that we are. the Managers of the Company fimned hereby and that we an: 
autIronzed fo cxecute these Artlcles of Orgaruzatu:m We each certIfY that to the bt-~ of our 
blowledge and behefthe fnctJt s:mted 10 Uu!> ce:rllficafc are lNe 




Jan 10 12 09:32p FANO INC 
Sunrise Press LLC 
) 
10520 Soutb 700 East 
Sandy, DT 84070 










Due on receipt 
J 
Qly B escription ___ I 
( 
500 Books 504 pages 6 x 9 on 50~ bright white black ink with full color 
cover 4jO on 14 point high gloss cover and perfect bound with 3 
knife trim I 
1,000 Booles 504- p ages (i x 9 on Sd# bright white black ink with fuj I color 
cover 4/0 on 14 point high gloss coyer and perfect bound with 3 
knife trim I 
April Fano 
1-&0 i -643-2039 
ACTi I angm i s inform 
Thank you for the opportunity to quote this project I 
801-766-11 58 p.J 
Estimate 
Date Estimate # 
7/2 1/2010 142& 
Project 
·Rate .. _ .. '. . Total - · 
9.56 
8.04 8.040.00T 
6.85% 873. 17 
Signature 
Appendix 4 
Jan 10 12 09:32p FANO INC 
j unrisc Press LLC 
10520 South 700 East 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Bil/To 
Rightway Publishing 
1]03 Waterside Dr. 






Due on receipt 






VIM Rate Amount 
\~-----------+----------------~--------------~--------~-----------r----------~ 
500 Books 504 pages 6 :x. 9 on 50# bJigh,t white black ink I'ith fun color 9.56 4,780.00T 
cover 4/0 on 14 point itigh gloss cover and perfect bound .... "ith J 
knife trim I 
j 





Thank you for the opportu:1ity 10 quo te this projeci 
The unders igned n<presents tha t shC:/hc is an nuthorized agcntiof the above :lamed CUSTOMER. The 
customer agrees lCl t ·10 following conditions: Customer rep;cscnts lha! they have the legal rigbt 10 print, 
p ublis h or d IS!rI :JltlC [he materIal lor will en m e oruer IS gtv"n and Will h'.iTcI S-UNRlSEPRESSl,armlcs~ lor 
Subtotal $4,780.00 
Sales Tax (6.85%) $)2 7 .4) 
any IOS5 s~ffcred through such prin ting. Payment or baJance is due upon complelelion of work. unlcss f-------------------~ 
p ri o:- ::lITUngt:'mCnts hU"e been rr.ac.le. (n lh" c"em of d<:fau h. the CUSTOMER agrees to pay <1::ty and all 
:cost, "rcolkclion . which may resu lt in 100% fees assessed. ihcluding all attorney's fees. All 
accounl,!im-oices over thirty (30) daY5, \';lLL BE charged nNANCE charges of! .5% per month . 
C us tomer also a grcC$:o pay a S2S.0{) returned cht:ck fee un a~y and all returned checks. 
I 
R Ece i V ED BY. DATE 
Total ~5,107.4J 
PaymentsfCredits so.oo 
Bafance Due .55 .1 0 7.4] 
